Tex. Far from being narrowly tailored, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. Compare post, at 3, 2228, with Brief for Respondents in No. Just prior to the plans implementation, for example, 4 of Seattles 11 high schools were imbalanced, i.e., almost exclusively black or almost exclusively white. By 1979, only two were out of balance. By 1980 only Cleveland remained out of balance (as the board defined it) and that by a mere two students. This sometimes leads to a disparity in resources and academic achievement between school districts. About 68% received their first choice. 2830 (cataloging state laws requiring separa- And when de facto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the remedial rules are different. If the Primary 1 (Kindergarten) placement does not enhance racial balance, a new application must be completed for Primary 2 (Grade One)). Parents Involved VI, 377 F.3d 949 (2004). The Seattle School district and Jefferson County district have applications that require a parent to state what the race of his or her child is. Initially, as the Court explained just last Term, we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated. Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006). See Powell 35. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. 6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (No Child Left Behind Act); 1067 et seq. ERIC - EJ919372 - The Path of Diversity in K-12 Educational 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., Sept. 24, 1985), p.3; Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. Cf. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. The District first gave priority to students who had a sibling at the school. The statement was not a technical holding in the case. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process. If a parent identifies more than one race on the form, [t]he application will not be accepted and, if necessary, the enrollment service person taking the application will indicate one box. App. in No. Indeed, remedial measures geared toward such broad and unrelated societal ills have no logical stopping point, ibid., and threaten to become ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future, Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality opinion). There has been considerable interest in this case, as demonstrated by the extraordinary number (approximately sixty) of amicus briefs filed in the case. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 211 (1976) (concurring opinion). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google, Opinion (Roberts), Concurrence (Thomas), Concurrence (Kennedy), Dissent (Breyer), Dissent (Stevens). These plans classify individuals by race and allocate benefits and burdens on that basis; and as a result, they are to be subjected to strict scrutiny. Compare, e.g., Green, 391 U.S., at 437438 (School boards operating state-compelled dual systems have an affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch), with, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S., at 745 (the Constitution does not impose a duty to desegregate upon districts that have not been shown to have committed any constitutional violation). . {{meta.fullTitle}} 1986). The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. This presumably refers to the districts decision to cease, for 20012002 school year assignments, applying the racial tiebreaker to students seeking to transfer to a different school after ninth grade. The justification for race-conscious remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. In 2000, for example, Roosevelt was the most popular first choice high school in Seattle; in 2001, Ballard was the most popular; in 2000, West Seattle was one of the least popular; by 2003, it was one of the more popular. And it has its roots in preventing what gradually may become the de facto resegregation of Americas public schools. That judge is not alone. at 116970. 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown the Supreme Courts greatest anti-discrimination decision); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. denied, 389 U. S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. Both cities once tried to achieve more integrated schools by relying solely upon measures such as redrawn district boundaries, new school building construction, and unrestricted voluntary transfers. Brief for Petitioner at 3536. The plurality also points to the school districts use of numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown of the general school population, and it faults the districts for failing to prove that no other set of numbers will work. For the 2005-2006 school year, seven out of ten of the high schools had racial balances that varied more than 15 percent from the racial balance of the school district as a whole. in No. [Footnote 28]. To begin with, Justice Breyer seeks to justify the plans at issue under our precedents recognizing the compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination. Order No. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. In Seattle, the district seeks white enrollment of between 31 and 51 percent (within 10 percent of the district white average of 41 percent), and nonwhite enrollment of between 49 and 69 percent (within 10 percent of the district minority average of 59 percent). And, in Seattle, the disadvantaged student loses at most one year at the high school of his choice. of Oral Arg. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. Governmental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases, assignments of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods, efforts to desegregate racially segregated schools, policies that favor minorities when distributing goods or services in short supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral districts, peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the basis of race, and others. Other amici dispute these findings. To that end, in 2011, the U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice jointly issued Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, acknowledging the flexibility that school districts have in taking proactive steps to meet the compelling interests of promoting diversity and avoiding racial isolation within the parameters of current law.[7]. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the pluralitys logic, be written out of the law). However, the question as to whether the constitution requires a local school board, or a State, to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not here concerned. See Washington State Report Am. By 1984, after several schools had fallen out of compliance with the orders racial percentages due to shifting demographics in the community, the school board revised its desegregation plan. The Ninth Circuit held that the burden had not been met since counsel for the School District admitted it was likely that the policy would be reinstated. Though the dissent admits to discomfort in applying strict scrutiny to these plans, it claims to have nonetheless applied that exacting standard. In my view, this contextual approach to scrutiny is altogether fitting. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996. It therefore reversed the lower courts original finding of no discrimination and remanded, instructing the lower court to issue an injunction to prevent the District from using this system. Roberts cites to: "Id., at 330, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. At most, those statistics show a national trend toward classroom racial imbalance. See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189. The Constitution and our precedents require more. in No. While diversity may lend to a robust education, parents and students have their own opinions on what factors promote the best education possible. So it was, as the dissent observes, see post, at 1314, that Louisville classified children by race in its school assignment and busing plan in the 1970s. 2. exemplifies the long-running disagreement over the meaning of racial discrimination under the Constitution. 2d 304: "[The law school's] policy makes clear there are many possible bases for diversity admissions, and provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other fields." In fact, Seattle apparently began to treat these different minority groups alike in response to the federal Emergency School Aid Acts requirement that it do so. [Footnote 11] But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 610 (1990) (We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals) (OConnor, J., dissenting). For example, where does the dissents principle stop? Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? PICS counters that neighborhood demographics are the result of individuals voluntary choices, and that parents tend to choose schools near their home. 72); Brief for Respondents in No. See Tr. 5455 (What is the great national and federal policy on this matter? First, in an open choice district like that in Seattle, using race as an isolated factor for admission may deny some students the opportunity to attend the school of their choice, thereby burdening those families affected. And what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards? Brief for Respondent at 1617. 4, p.86 ([Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion), with post, at 57 (The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document). While the County had been under a desegregation order from 1975 to 2000, this order had been dissolved when a federal judge found that it had largely solved the problem of segregated schools. 1 operates 10 regular public high schools. But to this the replication must be: Even so, measures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted. Achieving racially balanced school districts does not amount to a compelling government interest that satisfies strict scrutiny. PDF No. 11-345 In the Supreme Court of the United States - SCOTUSblog Source: C. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation 56 (2004) (Table 2.1). 05915, at 22. It is this part that went before the US Supreme Court as the other two cases were not appealed by JCPS. The plurality could validly claim that no court ever found that Seattle schools were segregated in law. of Oral Arg. Petitioner Crystal Meredith challenges the districts decision to deny her son Joshua McDonald a requested transfer for his kindergarten enrollment. See, e.g., Freeman, supra, at 494. Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin. After all, this Court has in many cases explicitly permitted districts to use target ratios based upon the districts underlying population. MacFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schoolsand Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Without attempting in these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling. Law is not an exercise in mathematical logic. Approximately 307 student assignments were affected by the racial tiebreaker in 20002001; the district was able to track the enrollment status of 293 of these students. But the evidence supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected school board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Just as diversity in higher education was deemed compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schoolswhere there is even more to gainmust be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest. See post, at 1824. [Footnote 8]. The upshot is that the cases to which the plurality refers, though all applying strict scrutiny, do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the same. 2005) (" Parents IV"). 67759, p.11 (It is implicit in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, that color or race is a constitutionally impermissible standard for the assignment of school children to public schools. Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing. Indeed, in 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a race-conscious state law seeking to undo de facto segregation: To support [their] claim, the defendants heavily rely on three Federal cases, each of which held, no State law being involved, that a local school board does not have an affirmative constitutional duty to act to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools that it did not cause. Id., at 43. Louisville's population is about 58% White; 38% Black, 2% Asian, 1.3% Hispanic. there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. They resemble other plans, promulgated by hundreds of local school boards, which have attempted a variety of desegregation methods that have evolved over time in light of experience. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education ( PICS ). v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F.2d 925, 932 (CA6), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918, reinstated with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (CA6 1974), and in 1975 the District Court entered a desegregation decree. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish these goals. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). in No. Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent cannot plausibly maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let alone makes it compelling. See, e.g., Coleman, Desegregation of the Public Schools (PDF) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 137 F.Supp. . He contended that whatever trends toward classroom racial imbalance have obtained, they were not the result of state-sanctioned segregation as in the pre-Brown era. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly relied upon Swanns guidance for decades to follow. Bd. But unlike the plurality, such a judge would also be aware that a legislature or school administrators, ultimately accountable to the electorate, could nonetheless properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks they mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation or to achieve a diverse student body in public schools. Rather, it must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied. of Cal. . In cases where an opinion or parts of an opinion do not reach a majority, the narrower opinion represents the holding, so Justice Kennedy's opinion represents parts of the holding of the case. This school was 10 miles from home, and Meredith sought to transfer Joshua to a school in a different cluster, Bloom Elementary, whichlike his resides schoolwas only a mile from home. Roberts provides the following string citation: Parents Involved in Cmty. See North Carolina Bd. Although the Court has certified three separate questions in this case, all three questions essentially involve the same inquiry: in light of the Courts rulings in Grutter and Gratz, does the Seattle School Districts use of race in high school admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause? This Courts opinion in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), fits comfortably within this framework. Our established strict scrutiny test for racial classifications, however, insists on detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means. Adarand, supra, at 236 (emphasis added). Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. See ante, at 3941 (plurality opinion) (comparing Jim Crow segregation to Seattle and Louisvilles integration polices); ante, at 2832 (Thomas, J., concurring). of Jefferson Cty., Nos. Bd. See 426 F.3d 1162, 11691171 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). Statements after the decision ; see also post, at 61. As for Louisville, its slate was cleared by the District Courts 2000 dissolution decree, which effectively declared that there were no longer any effects of de jure discrimination in need of remediation. In briefing and argument before this Court, Seattle contends that its use of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable schools. Id. 3 1996 Memorandum 58; Hampton I, supra, at 768, n.30. We granted certiorari. 36, 71 (1872) ([N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the Reconstruction amendments] . In both cases the efforts were in part remedial. The President of the United States dispatched the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federal troops were needed to enforce a desegregation decree. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination. Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. But in Seattle the plans are defended as necessary to address the consequences of racially identifiable housing patterns. In Brown, this Court held that the governments segregation of schoolchildren by race violates the Constitutions promise of equal protection. Today, however, the Court restricts (and some Members would eliminate) that leeway. The pluralitys postulate that [t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race, ante, at 4041, is not sufficient to decide these cases. to achieve its own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny. A to Kiner Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. 2002); Brief for Armor etal. in No. Indeed, the social scientists brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the positive impact as modest, id., at 13, acknowledging that there appears to be little or no effect on math scores, id., at 14, and admitting that the underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear, id., at 15. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm); post, at 65 (Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. Ante, at 1718. gent upon a particular racial mix. If the Court defers to the district, this will reaffirm local autonomy and give districts broad discretion to develop educational policy. Jefferson County fails to make clear to this Courteven in the limited respects implicated by Joshuas initial assignment and transfer denialwhether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and adhoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest. Since the Court granted writ over these objections, it seems likely that it will find jurisdiction exists. 3:02CV00620JGH; Doc. On the matter of stare decisis, I submit that the duration of the challenged practice, while it is persuasive, is not controlling. With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the Court. appeals for the ninth circuit, CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next This assertion is inexplicable. See Appendix A, infra. The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. 1, supra. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings). Adarand, supra, at 227. as a matter of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements. Then-Justice Rehnquist echoed this view in Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. They constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 501. And the fact that the state and local governments had relied on statements in this Courts opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court. None of these features is present in elementary and secondary schools. This decision departs from long-standing jurisprudence on school desegregation. [14], Neither school could plead this compelling interest, because "[w]e have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. See Brief for Respondent at 13. It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. Further research has shown that the desegregation of schools can help bring adult communities together by reducing segregated housing. Where there has been de jure segregation, there is a cognizable legal wrong, and the courts and legislatures have broad power to remedy it. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once againeven for very different reasons. See supra, at 3745. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Grutter, supra, at 326. To invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown. No. For example, the dissent features Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan City School Dist.